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Abstract In his classic analysis, Gould (The mismeasure
of man, WW Norton, New York, 1981) demolished the
idea that intelligence was an inherent, genetic trait of dif-
ferent human groups by emphasizing, among other things,
(a) its sensitivity to environmental input, (b) the incom-
mensurate pre-test preparation of different human groups,
and (c) the inadequacy of the testing contexts, in many
cases. According to Gould, the root cause of these over-
sights was confirmation bias by psychometricians, an
unwarranted commitment to the idea that intelligence was a
fixed, immutable quality of people. By virtue of a similar,
systemic interpretive bias, in the last two decades,
numerous contemporary researchers in comparative psy-
chology have claimed human superiority over apes in
social intelligence, based on two-group comparisons
between postindustrial, Western Europeans and captive
apes, where the apes have been isolated from European
styles of social interaction, and tested with radically dif-
ferent procedures. Moreover, direct comparisons of
humans with apes suffer from pervasive lapses in argu-
mentation: Research designs in wide contemporary use are
inherently mute about the underlying psychological causes
of overt behavior. Here we analyze these problems and
offer a more fruitful approach to the comparative study of
social intelligence, which focuses on specific individual
learning histories in specific ecological circumstances.
Keywords Social cognition  Mental causality 
Comparative methods  Species comparisons
Hereditarianism and human intelligence
A century ago, developers of intelligence tests were con-
vinced that they had devised measures of native intellectual
ability in our species (Gould 1981). By mid-century, it was
apparent that performance on these assessments was highly
influenced by non-hereditary factors, and they were re-in-
terpreted as effective predictors of performance, rather than
as instruments that revealed something essential about
mental aptitude (for review see Neisser et al. 1996). We
now know that intellectual performance in our species is a
function of gene–environment interactions: impoverished
environments have systematically deleterious effects on
mental development (Nelson et al. 2007). Yet, today,
researchers routinely report, in the most prestigious jour-
nals, claims that human children, even as young as
12 months of age, are inherently superior in social intelli-
gence—the skilled negotiation of social interactions—to
our nearest living relatives, the great apes. Of particular
relevance to this special issue is the fact that a large pro-
portion of this literature derives from the study of apes’ use
and comprehension of gestures. Here we resurrect Gould’s
(1981) classic analysis of the misuse of so-called intelli-
gence tests in humans and apply these principles to the
contemporary literature on alleged ape–human differences
in social intelligence. We also deconstruct the logical
pathways from research design to conclusions in a number
of representative studies, demonstrating the widespread
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infiltration of fallacious reasoning in this field of endeavor.
We conclude with specific recommendations for more
legitimate research design and reasoning in comparative
cognition.
In examining Yerkes’s (1921) monograph on intelli-
gence testing in military recruits, Gould (1981) noted that,
among other variables, health and schooling were corre-
lated with IQ. For example, military recruits infested with
hookworm performed reliably worse than non-infected
recruits. Similarly, military recruits with less formal
schooling experience performed worse than recruits with
more schooling. Variations in IQ were, thus, variable in
relation to environmental factors. Yerkes interpreted these
variations as gene-environment correlations—in effect
arguing that more intelligent people were more effective in
avoiding hookworm and more persistent in pursuing
schooling. A colleague of Yerkes, Carl Brigham (1923,
cited in Gould 1981), when faced with a sharp north/south
divide in mental test scores in Black recruits even argued
that more intelligent Black people migrated to the northern
USA to benefit from the northern states’ increased school
expenditure. Thus, even obvious effects of environmental
factors on mental performance were ignored in favor of
nativist explanations for systematic group differences.
Gould (1981) also excoriated Brigham for ignoring
important differences in recruits’ preparations for taking
these early IQ tests. Brigham found a consistent, large
advantage on psychometric tests of intelligence for longer-
term residents of the USA than for recent arrivals. Rather
than accepting the obvious explanation that people longer
resident in the USA had more familiarity with American
customs and the English language, Brigham proffered a
tortuous argument to the effect that the composition of
immigrants from Europe had shifted from more intelligent
and creative people of northern European descent toward
people of Slavic or southern European origins in the years
immediately prior to testing. This kind of obvious bias and
special pleading toward nativist explanations for systematic
group differences in test preparedness seems antiquated to
contemporary scientists, but as we shall see, it is entirely
characteristic of cross-species comparisons between humans
and apes. (Brigham 1930, later recanted these nativist con-
clusions, noting that theywere ‘‘without foundation,’’ p 165.)
Finally, Gould (1981) observed the profound lack of
standardization in selection criteria and administrative
protocols across different venues of the early military tests.
In short, there was no standardization of sampling criteria
across different human groups, nor was there standardiza-
tion of testing protocols across these groups—these perva-
sive confounds with ‘‘race’’ were generally ignored by what
Gould termed the ‘‘hereditarians’’; a cadre of intellectuals
and scientists who were committed, a priori, to the idea that
there were systematic differences between different
‘‘kinds’’ of people—for example, it was self-evident to
these researchers that northern Europeans were more
intellectually able than southern or eastern Europeans.
Hence, blinded by their commitment to this assumption of
northern European superiority, the researchers turned a
blind eye to the lack of standardization in sampling regi-
mens and testing conditions that pervaded and confounded
group identity with sampling and measurement procedures.
We argue, here, that a parallel, systemic blindness exists in
the contemporary practice of comparative cognition: Vir-
tually no attempt is made to exert control over sampling
criteria from different species, and only rarely are even
similar protocols used to test representatives of different
species, especially when one of those species is human
(Bard and Leavens 2009, 2014; Hopkins et al. 2013;
Leavens 2014; Leavens and Bard 2011; Leavens et al. 2008;
Lyn 2010; Lyn et al. 2010; Racine et al. 2008). Because one
of the most oft-stated ambitions of research in comparative
cognition is to chart the taxonomic distribution of cognitive
character states (e.g., Povinelli and Eddy 1996, pp 1–16;
and the special section on comparative cognition in the
journal, Psychological Science 1993, vol. 4, iss. 3, among
others), it is of significant theoretical import to evaluate the
state of the art in this field. One of the goals of this com-
parative research program is to reveal the existence of
alleged specialized learning mechanisms which can, in turn,
inform theoretical considerations of the selective histories
in different taxonomic lineages. As will become clear,
below, we believe that there are significant and widespread
methodological and logical deficiencies with much con-
temporary work in this area, and this has substantially
skewed theoretical consideration of these selective pres-
sures to relatively recent times—particularly ecological
changes of our ancestors during the Pliocene and Pleis-
tocene epochs, in which no existing congener to our own
species can claim their origin (the last common ancestor of
apes and humans existed in the Miocene). Thus, there is a
suite of allegedly unique human cognitive specializations
for understanding other minds that have, according to an
increasingly dominant view in comparative psychology and
in ethology, no parallel in the other hominoids. This dom-
inant view in contemporary theory, that there is no sub-
stantive psychological continuity between humans and their
closest living relatives, has focused theoretical attention on
the presumed selective effects of the ecological circum-
stances of Plio-Pleistocene hominids. Moreover, these
cross-species psychological assessments are often presented
as unbiased assays of real, systematic species differences in
psychological function that neatly discriminate between the
taxa under scrutiny. Here we argue that the design of many
of these assays of psychological function cannot support
any unqualified assertion to the effect either (a) that such
data clearly identify psychological mechanisms or (b) that
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these comparative studies between humans and other ani-
mals have identified psychological discontinuities between
the species, grounded in evolutionarily adaptive events or
processes.
Confounded research designs
Some readers might believe that we are over-stating the
case; after all, is not there nearly a scientific consensus that
apes have difficulty following human cues, such as gaze
and pointing, to locations of hidden food? Table 1 lists a
number of representative studies that directly compared
apes with human children, and all reported an advantage to
humans in the cognitive capabilities allegedly under test.
This tabulation reveals that testing environments, pre-
experimental task-relevant preparation, sampling protocols,
testing protocols, and age at testing were all systematically
confounded with species classification, exactly paralleling
the pervasive deficiencies of the intelligence testing pro-
tocols of a century ago, as identified by Gould (1981). In all
of the studies in Table 1, the apes were tested in cages,
whereas the humans were not tested in cages—there were,
thus, systematic differences in testing environments, and
none of these studies made any apparent attempt to match
testing environments across the groups. To accept the
reported findings at face value, a reader must assume that
engaging participants through cage bars or cage mesh has
no effect on performance, an assumption that is unwar-
ranted (see Kirchhofer et al. 2012, for evidence of the
suppressive effect of physical barriers on performance in
dogs, Canis familiaris).
Table 1 Representative claims of evolutionarily based human
uniqueness in social cognition based on direct ape–human compar-
isons are confounded with systematic group differences in testing
environment, task preparation, sampling protocols, testing proce-
dures, and/or age of subjects at testing
Source Putative mental state (p)a Confounds (Y = present, N = absent)
Envir.b Task Prep.c Sampl.d Test. Proc.e Age
Povinelli and Eddy (1996)f Seeing leads to knowing Y Y Y Y N
Povinelli et al. (1997)g Appreciation of internal mental focus Y Y Y Y Y
Tomasello et al. (1997)h Understanding communicative intentions Y Y Y Y Y
Call and Tomasello (1999)i Understanding false belief Y Y Y Y Y
Povinelli et al. (1999)j Understanding attention as a mental state Y Y Y Y Y
Warneken et al. (2006)k Shared intentionality Y Y Y Y Y
Herrmann et al. 20071 Understanding communicative intentions Y Y Y Y Y
Liszkowski et al. 2009m Common conceptual ground Y Y Y Y Y
van der Goot et al. (2014)n Common conceptual ground Y Y Y Y Y
Refutations: Most of these studies, except Povinelli et al. (1999), asserted a theoretical rationale comprising a major premise of the form: if p then
q, and reported an absence of a behavior (*q) in apes, and therefore, refutations are empirical demonstrations that these index behaviors have
been displayed by apes (q); Povinelli et al. (1999) asserted that if organisms understood visual attention at a high level (p), then they expected the
absence of a discrimination of gaze direction in their probe condition C (*q)—in their study humans failed to discriminate gaze direction (*q),
but chimpanzees did discriminate gaze direction (q), therefore the refutation by Thomas et al. (2008) involved the demonstration by reductio ad
absurdum that human adults discriminated gaze direction (q) like the chimpanzees in Povinelli et al. (1999), and therefore, according to the
argument of Povinelli and colleagues, human adults displayed a low-level, non-mentalistic understanding of visual attention
a
p = antecedent in the conditional: if p then q
b
Envir. Testing environment
c Task Prep. Task preparation (i.e., pre-experimental, task-relevant experience)
d Sampl. sampling procedure
e Test. Proc. Testing procedure
f Refuted by Bulloch et al. (2008), Hostetter et al. (2007)
g Refuted by Lyn et al. (2010), Mulcahy and Call (2009)
h Partially refuted (pointing comprehension) by Lyn et al. (2010), Mulcahy and Call (2009)
i refuted by Krupenye et al. (2016)
j Refuted by Thomas et al. (2008)
k Refuted by Bard et al. (2014a), Warneken et al. (2007)
l Refuted by Russell et al. (2011)
m Refuted by Bohn et al. (2015, 2016), Lyn et al. (2014)
n Refuted by Leavens et al. (2015)
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In all of the studies listed in Table 1, institutionalized
apes were compared with non-institutionalized human
children. The vast majority of the apes involved were
isolated from early intensive exposure to human nonverbal
conventions of give and take and of daily exposure to
nonverbal reference to entities, whereas none of the human
children were so isolated. Hence, the human children had
had extensive task-relevant preparation when challenged to
use human nonverbal cues, such as ostensive gaze or
pointing gestures, for example, to find hidden objects. Yet
the researchers cited in Table 1 universally concluded that
the humans’ superior performances were attributable to
their evolutionary, and not their developmental histories.
Even when the apes outperformed humans, as in Povinelli
et al. (1999), the scientists interpreted their chimpanzees’
(Pan troglodytes) superior performance as evidence for the
animals’ inferior understanding of visual attention. In some
of these studies, we find a few individual apes who had
been enculturated from an early age. For example, in
Tomasello et al. (1997), two of the apes, Chantek, an
orangutan (Pongo pygmaeus), and Erika, a chimpanzee,
had been raised in human cultural environments, whereas
the remaining apes in that study were institutionalized from
birth. When computing the average performance of the
apes with the human children (two-and-a-half to 3 years
old), the authors found a statistically significant difference
between humans and apes in using a pointing gesture to
find hidden objects, favoring the humans. But when
Leavens (2014) compared the children with the only two
apes who had had commensurate task-relevant preparation,
he found that the apes performed comparably. Thus, as
Leavens (2014) noted, there is a systematic and method-
ologically problematic tendency to artificially suppress the
results of non-humans by averaging performance data
between (a) apes that have had significant task-relevant
preparation (enculturated apes) and (b) apes that have been
denied this preparation (institutionalized or sanctuary-
housed apes). Thus, in order to accept these reports that
apes have difficulty understanding deictic gestures or pro-
ducing deictic gestures, a reader must assume that experi-
ence with the daily use of deictic gestures is not relevant to
performance in understanding or producing deictic ges-
tures—an unwarranted assumption (Leavens 2006; Leav-
ens et al. 2008; Lyn 2010; Lyn et al. 2010).
A related and systematic confound with species clas-
sification is sampling protocol. It is rudimentary that
failure to match sampling protocols introduces a confound
into any group comparison. Thus, for an example,
Kirchhofer et al. (2012) compared pet dogs with chim-
panzees in their understanding of experimenters’ pointing
gestures—the specific task was that the subjects were to
fetch the objects to which experimenters pointed. As
noted by Hopkins et al. (2013), the dogs were recruited
through advertisements, introducing a self-selection pro-
cedure for the dog owners, whereas the apes were
opportunistically sampled from a zoo and from a sanc-
tuary. Although Kirchhofer et al. interpreted the superior
performance by the dogs as evidence for the effects of
artificial selection (breeding), in fact, it is ambiguous
whether the selective histories or the different sampling
protocols account for the group differences observed. For
another example, Liszkowski et al. (2009) selected only
human infants who had demonstrated prior use of point-
ing, but did not apply this same selection criterion to their
ape subjects. Similarly, with reference to the studies listed
in Table 1, where apes were compared to humans, the
apes were always opportunistically sampled from captive
populations, whereas the children were recruited, pri-
marily, through advertisements. It is categorically
ambiguous, therefore, whether the group differences
reported in the papers listed in Table 1 are attributable to
systematic differences in evolutionary histories or to dif-
ferences in sampling protocols.
With respect to test procedures, none of the studies
listed in Table 1 administered the same procedures to the
apes and to the humans. For example, Povinelli and Eddy
(1996) were unable to teach human two- to seven-year-old
children to point to experimenters (p 109, fn 6),1 so
instead of requiring the same gestural response from the
children and the apes that were compared in that study,
the authors required the children to indicate their choice
of experimenter by placing their hands on a handprint
provided for them. Here, the experimenters were unable to
elicit pointing gestures from human children, but claimed
cognitive superiority for these same children, compared
with apes who pointed to an experimenter through a hole
in a plexiglas barrier. In that study, it is ambiguous
whether the children outperformed the apes because of
their alleged cognitive superiority (as Povinelli and Eddy
claimed) or because the experimenters administered an
easier task to the human children. For another example,
van der Goot et al. (2014) measured whether apes and
human children locomoted to the closest possible prox-
imity to unreachable toys (human children) or food
(mostly adult apes), but the humans were tested at
1 Lest some readers doubt the veracity of this claim:
we attempted to teach children to point in the same manner as
the chimpanzees, but most children were extremely reluctant or
embarrassed to come forward and point at the experimenters.
In addition, the points that they did produce were often so
subdued that it was difficult to determine exactly to whom they
were referring. In contrast, the children rapidly adapted to the
procedure of extending their arm and placing it on the hand-
print in front of the target experimenter in order to obtain their
rewards (stickers). (Povinelli and Eddy 1996, fn 6, p 109,
emphasis added).
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distances of less than 2 m between themselves and the
unreachable toys, whereas the apes were (inexplicably)
presented with unreachable food at a distance of 6 m.
They found that roughly half of the children stayed in situ
and pointed to the toys without locomoting to proximity
with the toys, whereas none of the 10 apes gestured to
food without first traversing the 6 m to the closest prox-
imity with the food before gesturing. van der Goot and
her colleagues interpreted this group difference as evi-
dence for a uniquely human capacity to discern a state of
psychological common ground, but because two different
procedures were administered to the two groups (apes and
human children), it is unclear whether the apes were more
likely than the children to move to proximity with the
unreachable entities because of their evolutionary histories
or because of some or all of the many systematic proce-
dural differences. In an observational study, Leavens et al.
(2015) found that when they presented unreachable food
to 166 chimpanzees at distances approximating those used
with human infants in van der Goot et al., then like the
children in van der Goot et al., approximately half of the
apes communicated from a distance, and half moved to
proximity with the food before signaling about it (note
that approximately matching just one procedural feature,
distance, led to statistically indistinguishable response
profiles between humans and apes, despite many proce-
dural differences between Leavens et al. 2015 and van der
Goot et al. 2014). Thus, all direct ape–human comparisons
that have reported human superiority in cognitive function
have universally failed to match the groups on testing
environment, test preparation, sampling protocols, and test
procedures, including those that tested subjects’ compre-
hension and production of communicative gestures
(Table 1), although we provide only a few examples, here.
Moreover, as repeatedly noted by Bard and her col-
leagues (e.g., Bard and Leavens 2014; Bard et al.
2014a), none of these studies matched the apes with the
humans on age at testing (Table 2); indeed, in only one
of these studies, that by Povinelli and Eddy (1996), was
there even any overlap in age between the apes and the
humans. For example, Liszkowski et al. (2009) compared
12-month-old human children with apes that were, on
average, 19 years old, reporting that humans, but not
apes, communicated about absent entities. van der Goot
et al. (2014) compared 12-month-old human children
with apes that were, on average, nearly 18 years old,
concluding that humans, but not apes, communicate with
gestures from a distance. Again, it is ambiguous whether
the group differences reported by these authors cited in
Table 1 are attributable to differences in evolutionary
histories, as the authors claimed, or to the systematic
differences in life history stage at which these subjects
were tested—not one of these studies validated their
protocols on humans that were age-matched to the apes,
again, with the possible exception of Povinelli and Eddy
(1996).
These studies (Table 1) failed to control for systematic
group differences in environment, task preparation, sam-
pling protocols, testing procedures, and age, yet these
researchers not only concluded, often implicitly, that these
confounds were irrelevant, through asserting that species
classification (i.e., evolutionary history) was the only rel-
evant factor, they also managed to convince a number of
reviewers and editors that these confounds were not rele-
vant to their findings of group differences. The journals in
which the papers listed in Table 1 were not, by and large,
obscure journals: they included Science, Psychological
Science, and Child Development—prestigious journals
Table 2 Age differences at
time of testing are confounded
with species classifications in
direct ape–human comparisons:
representative studies
Age ranges in years (n)
Humans Apes Overlap in age?
Povinelli and Eddy (1996) 2–7 (47) 4–6 (6) Yes
Povinelli et al. (1997)
Experiment 1 3 (24) 6–7 (7) No
Experiment 2 3 (12) 6–7 (7) No
Tomasello et al. (1997) 2.5–3 (48) 7–23 (8) No
Call and Tomasello (1999) 4–5 (28) 7–37 (9) No
Povinelli et al. (1999) 3 (24) 6 (7) No
Warneken et al. (2006) 1.5–2 (32) 3–4 (3) No
Herrmann et al. (2007) 2 (105) 3–21 (138) No
Liszkowski et al. (2009) 1 (32) 6–31 (16) No
van der Goot et al. (2014) (Exper. 1) 1 (20) 9–35 (16) No
Mean ages are not computable for all of these studies, and hence we report minimum and maximum ages at
times of testing for each group
Exper. Experiment
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with large international readerships. Thus, manifestly,
reviewers and editors at some of the most influential sci-
entific journals believed that these researchers had identi-
fied an influence of evolutionary history on the cognitive
underpinnings of, among other things, apes’ and humans’
understanding and production of communicative gestures.
Yet, when we cursorily examine some of the uncontrolled
variables in these studies, we find that not one of these
papers has isolated evolutionary history as the singular
factor in the group performance differences reported in
these papers. This pervasive collapse in experimental and
interpretive rigor is not unprecedented, as Gould (1981) so
elegantly noted in relation to the virtually unquestioned
assumption, 100 years ago, that northern Europeans had the
highest average intellectual capacity in our species. This
tacit understanding seemed to have the effect of ‘‘blinding’’
researchers to the multitudinous confounds that existed
alongside their racial group classifications. Our reading of
the contemporary literature on comparative social cogni-
tion leads us to assert that there are similarly numerous and
universal confounds of method with species classifications.
It is our contention, here, that there is no methodologically
sound report of an essential difference between apes and
humans in their abilities to use or comprehend simple
gestural cues, due to the systematic confounds listed in
Table 1. This is not to claim that there could not be a such
a demonstration in the future, but it seems clear from the
many uncritical citations of alleged ape–human differences
in the ability to use and comprehend simple deictic ges-
tures, like overt gaze and pointing, that many contemporary
researchers have abandoned any critical evaluation of these
empirically unfounded claims. It seems possible, in view of
the chasm that exists between evidence and belief that we
document here, that there may be a deep, yet unwarranted
commitment to the ideas (a) that comprehension and pro-
duction of pointing, understanding of visual attention,
understanding common ground, or discrimination of false
belief require sophisticated reasoning abilities and (b) that
humans uniquely possess these hypothetical reasoning
abilities.
The scientific sterility of two-group, two-species
comparisons
In addition to the systematic methodological weaknesses
that underlie reports of human superiority in the use and
understanding of simple directional gestures, these claims
rely on the core assumption that intentional and epistemic
states cause overt behavior. This model of mental cause
with behavioral effect is scientifically unfalsifiable
whenever the putative cause is not empirically
measurable.
It is a near-universal premise in the contemporary cog-
nitive sciences that mental states cause behavior.2 While
there are many critiques of this premise, including theo-
retical positions grounded in distributed or embodied
cognitive perspectives (e.g., Barrett 2015; Chemero 2011;
Johnson 2001; Sehon 2000; Varela et al. 1991) and also
some recent extensions of behaviorism, in which contin-
gencies are conceived of as having very extended temporal
manifestations (including Baum’s molar behaviorism and
Rachlin’s teleological behaviorism; see, e.g., Baum 2002;
Rachlin 1992),3 here we will establish the unfalsifiability of
this premise to illustrate the logic used in the many claims
of human uniqueness. As noted by Malle and Hodges
(2005), there are classes of mental state that can be effects
of behavior (e.g., perceptions) and there are classes of
mental state that are causes (e.g., epistemic states). It is this
latter class of hypothetical mental states that concerns us,
here—including intentions, beliefs, and desires.
A representative range of putative causal mental states
are presented in Table 1. There are, in broad terms, two
versions of the mental causality model: a strong version in
which particular behavioral patterns (q) index particular
causal mental states (p)—that is, the intentional or epis-
temic state is both necessary and sufficient to cause the
behavior pattern—and a weaker version in which a par-
ticular behavioral pattern merely implicates a particular
mental state—in other words, the putative mental state is a
2 For simplicity in argumentation, we include as causes alternative
formulations in which certain mental states may merely facilitate or
make more probable correct responses patterns in a cognitive
challenge. As an anonymous reviewer pointed out, other possibilities
exist: For example, it could be that correct performance in a
discrimination task is necessary, but not sufficient condition for the
presence of causal mental states (q ) p), which is the logical
converse of stating that p is sufficient for q. In this case, the converse
of p) q, the mental causality model imposes an asymmetry that does
not exist in purely inferential logic—scientific explanations seek to
account for a behavior in terms of the actions of hypothetical,
temporally prior causes. This temporal asymmetry does not neces-
sarily exist in purely formal contexts—indeed, the converse relation-
ship that exists between sufficiency and necessity in logic is only
legitimate when it is not the case that p and q exist in a fixed, non-
overlapping temporal order, as they do in mental causality models.
Thus, while it is a correct rule of inference that if p is sufficient for
q to be the case then q is necessary for p, this relation between
sufficiency and necessity breaks down when the context is explana-
tory, with a fixed, asymmetrical relation between p and q, as in the
present context. Hence, the converse (q ) p) will not be further
considered here. In addition, it might be that mental states are neither
necessary nor sufficient causes for high performance in a discrimi-
nation task (i.e., that p and q have no causal relationship), because our
concern, here, is to highlight the inability to empirically test the truth
of models of alleged mental causality, therefore this lies beyond the
scope of this paper.
3 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for bringing Baum’s and
Rachlin’s work to our attention.
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sufficient, but not a necessary condition for display of the
behavior pattern of interest.
Mental states as necessary causes (biconditional)
An example of the claim that some gestures index par-
ticular causal mental states is that by Tomasello et al.
(e.g., 2007); in their account, declarative-expressive and
declarative-informative gestures index a psychological
appreciation of others’ minds. Declarative-expressive
gestures, according to this account, include such acts as
pointing to an entity with the motive that an interlocutor
share attention to that entity: ‘‘the communicator wants
the recipient to feel some attitude or emotion that he is
already feeling’’ (p 707). Declarative-informative ges-
tures, on the other hand, allegedly index a motivation for
sharing states of knowledge—for example, a child might
point to inform an interlocutor of the location of hidden
entities, or as Tomasello et al. (2007) put it: ‘‘the com-
municator wants the recipient to know something that he
thinks she will find useful or interesting’’ (p 707).
According to proponents of this view, first, the mere fact
of declarative-expressive and declarative-informative
communication constitutes evidence for these commu-
nicative motivations that allegedly couple the emotions or
the epistemic states of two interlocutors, and, second,
these motivations are absent in humans’ nearest living
relatives, the great apes:
apes do not produce, either for humans or for other
apes, points that serve functions other than the
imperative/requestive function. That is, they do not
point declaratively to simply share interest and
attention in something with another individual, and
they do not point informatively to inform others of
things they want or need to know (Tomasello et al.
2007, p 717).
Thus, in this strong version of the mental causality
model, the alleged absence of declarative-expressive and
declarative-informative gestures in great apes entails that
apes lack these putative cognitive states, and the presence
of declarative-expressive and declarative-informative ges-
tures in our species entails that humans possess these
mental states.
According to the logic of necessary and sufficient
causes (if p then q AND if q then p, or p , q), the
biconditional relationship between p and q is true only if
p and q are always both true (present) or both false
(absent; Table 3). Thus, if these putative communicative
motivations to share emotional and epistemic states
(p) occur in the absence of declarative-expressive or
declarative-informative communication (q), then the claim
that these hypothetical mental states are necessary and
sufficient for declarative communication is falsified. Also,
if declarative-expressive or declarative-informative com-
munication (q) occurs in the absence of the motivation to
share emotional or epistemic states (p), then the postulate
of the biconditional relationship between the alleged
causal mental states and the diagnostic communicative
behaviors is falsified.
That this strong version of the mental causality model of
gestural communication is empirically unfalsifiable is
obvious when one reflects that it is, in practice, impossible
to assign a truth value to the presence or absence of any
hypothetical causal mental state, p (e.g., Bergmann 1962;
Leavens et al. 2004a; Vanderwolf 1998). Thus, although
declarative-expressive and declarative-informative com-
municative acts can be either present or absent, empiri-
cally, because we cannot objectively measure the presence
and absence of the putative causal mental state (p), there-
fore, the claim that declarative-expressives and declarative-
informatives (q) uniquely implicate these alleged causal
mental states is not a scientifically falsifiable claim. This
might not be immediately obvious to some readers, but if,
instead of causal mental states, we were to argue that
demonic possession entailed declarative-expressive and
declarative-informative communicative acts, then it should
be straightforward to see that the association between
demonic possession and communicative acts cannot be
empirically determined—there is no such thing as a
demonic possession measuring device, notwithstanding the
Table 3 Biconditional mental causality models, and their implica-
tions for comparative cognition
Assume p exists The reality: p is indeterminable
p q p , q p q p , q
Biconditional (p is a necessary cause for q; q if and only if p)
T T T T? T ?
T F F* T? F ?
F T F* F? T ?
F F T F? F ?
Under the assumption, at left, that p is determinable (i.e., that the
presence and absence of p is determinable, hence a truth value can be
legitimately applied to both p and q), the asterisks denote the states of
the world that would disconfirm the premise p, q. The premise p,
q would be falsified whenever p and q have incommensurate truth
values (i.e., whenever one is true, or present, and the other is false, or
absent). Here we argue that, in reality, because p is imaginary and
cannot be objectively measured, as shown at right, therefore there is
no possibility of disconfirming the premise p , q. Thus, all mental
causality models that posit a certain mental state (p) to be a necessary
cause for a particular behavior (q) are unfalsifiable
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widely held belief that supernatural agents influence human
behavior.4
Moreover, there are many published examples of
declarative-expressive and declarative-informative com-
municative acts performed by great apes (for reviews, e.g.,
Leavens and Bard 2011; Leavens et al. 2008; Leavens and
Racine 2009):
both declarative and informative pointing have been
reported in apes, usually, but not always, language-
trained or home-raised apes. Examples of informative
pointing include Peter, who when asked, ‘‘Where’s
Dada?’’ pointed to Mr. McArdle (Witmer 1909); Gua,
who pointed to her nose when asked, ‘‘Where is your
nose?’’ and who pointed to pictures of objects when
given their names (Kellogg and Kellogg 1933);
Washoe, who often pointed in response to similar
queries, but who was often further required to sign
the object’s name (see discussion in Savage-Rum-
baugh et al. 1985); Matata, who sometimes pointed in
the direction of faraway noises while walking in the
woods (Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1998); and Kanzi,
Panbanisha, and Nyota, who pointed declaratively
and informatively (Pedersen et al. 2009). In short,
virtually every language-trained or home-raised ape
apparently points declaratively or informatively (for
example, in response to questions of the form,
‘‘Where is X?’’) (Leavens and Bard 2011:18).
Declarative-informative pointing by a single, free-ranging
bonobo (Pan paniscus) was reported by Vea` and Sabater-Pi
(1998), and an apparent declarative-expressive deictic ges-
ture by a wild chimpanzee was reported by Hobaiter et al.
(2014). The showing of an object by a young chimpanzee to
their social partner was reported by Russell et al. (1997); this
was a quintessential, declarative-expressive signal, as defined
for human children by Bates et al. (1975). Thus, declarative-
expressive and declarative-informative communicative acts
have been reported in great apes, and therefore, according to
the biconditional argument of Tomasello et al. (2007), that
these behaviors index certain causal mental states, we must
attribute to these animals the communicative motivations
that they claim are signified by this kind of behavior, the
motivations to share feelings and to share epistemic states. In
other words, if the major premise p , q is assumed to be
true, as asserted by Tomasello et al. (e.g., 2007), then the
demonstration of q in non-humans entails the presence and
causal influence of the hypothetical mental state p. No other
interpretation is possible with a strong mental causality
model that posits unique behavioral indices of causal mental
states (see Table 3). However, rather than defend their own
postulate, and acknowledge that according to their own
psychological process model, great apes share with humans
the motivations to share feelings and epistemic states,
Tomasello and his colleagues have taken the position that
such reports constitute measurement error. That is, they
argue that the existing reports of declarative signals displayed
by non-human primates and other animals constitute mis-
classifications of behavior, and they include as an example of
such misclassification their own previous report of declara-
tive communication by two chimpanzees (Carpenter et al.
1995; see discussion in Carpenter and Call 2013).
It becomes clear that a strong version of the mental
causality model of gestural communication is untenable
when the nature of the measurement error (misclassifica-
tion) is specified. Thus, Carpenter and Call (2013) argued
that ‘‘when apes gesture for others, there is no unequivocal
evidence that they do so with the sole (and spontaneous)
goal of sharing attention and interest with others about
something’’ (p 57). This position contains two subtle
rhetorical devices: a misdirection and a begging of the
question. First, the reader is misdirected toward a focus on
the psychological ambiguity of ape gestures and away from
the commensurate ambiguity of young humans’ gestures;
because there is no ‘‘unequivocal evidence’’ that any
nonverbal organism of any species ever displays the ‘‘sole
(and spontaneous) goal of sharing attention and interest,’’
therefore the strong mental causality model reduces to a
simple interpretive bias to the effect that if the signaler has
a lot of fur, then the communicative act is not performed
with the hypothetical mental cause (p). Second, Carpenter
and Call conclude that when humans display declarative
gestures, it is taken to index social goals that are absent
from the gestural communication of great apes, but this
begs the question of the nature of the evidence for those
same goals in the communicative gestures of preverbal
humans, who cannot assert those goals; this constitutes a
double standard of proof. Thus, in summary, their argu-
ment reduces the strong, biconditional position to the
weaker, conditional position—because a ‘‘truly’’ declara-
tive act now is defined by the presence of a concomitant
motivational state that has no unique behavioral index. In
effect, Carpenter and Call (2013) have argued that a
communicative act can be ambiguous as to its mental
4 There are standard methods for the determination of demonic
possession, both historically (Kors and Peters 2001) and in the present
day (e.g., MinisteringDeliverance.com). For example, ‘‘[a]rthritis,
cancer, HIV, and a host of other illnesses are almost always caused by
evil spirits. If it cannot be easily cured, then it’s almost always a spirit
that is causing it’’ (http://www.ministeringdeliverance.com/demonic_
signs.php); this claim constitutes a claim that demonic possession is a
sufficient cause of these diseases. For an example of a necessary and
sufficient cause:, a ‘‘man may very surely be known for a demoniac if
he is disturbed when the exorcisms are read’’ (Guazzo, 1608/1988,
p. 168); this claim is of precisely the same form as the claim that we
know that humans possess unique psychological motivations for
communication when they display declarative-expressive or declara-
tive-informative communication.
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causes, and this constitutes a concession that hypothetical
causal mental states are not actually necessary, but merely
sufficient causes. Thus, even if ape–human comparisons
were methodologically rigorous, there is no unique, non-
verbal behavioral index of any alleged causal mental state
(Povinelli and Giambrone 2001).
Mental states as sufficient causes (conditional)
This weaker, and more popular, version of the mental
causality model is the idea that certain mental states are
sufficient, but not necessary to the display of certain
communicative acts. This is the position of Povinelli et al.
(2000): ‘‘the exact same behaviors can be produced [both
with] and without… explicit representation of mental
states’’ (2000, p 533). According to this weaker version,
organisms can succeed in experimental tasks like those
listed in Table 1 in one of at least two ways: either (a) the
organism has a cognitive capacity that causes their own
response patterns to the experimental challenges (p)—that
is, they understand that seeing by others leads to others’
knowing, that others have particular communicative
intentions, that others can have false beliefs, or that the
organism and another can have a conceptual common
ground—or (b) the organism has acquired some kind of
rule-based response pattern based on cues associated with
the conceptual factors listed in Table 1, albeit without the
conceptual understanding—in other words, the organism
can acquire correct response patterns through allegedly
simpler, non-conceptual learning mechanisms (which, for
simplicity in exposition, we will designate *p; see
Table 4 for the specific argumentation).
If these mental states are merely sufficient causes of
overt behavior, then the relationship between putative
mental capabilities and behavior is, by definition, a
conditional relationship: if such and such a mental state
(p) is present in the mind of the subject then they will
display such and such a behavior (q). In the contempo-
rary literature, there is a near-universal commitment to
the idea that behavior does not uniquely implicate a
precipitating epistemic mental state; thus, a given
response pattern (q) could result from the effects of
particular hypothetical mental causes (p) or from some
other psychological process that does not involve these
precipitating mental causes (*p: e.g., Povinelli and
Giambrone 2001; Povinelli et al. 2000; contra Tomasello
et al. 2007). Thus, when any given response pattern
(q) can be caused by alleged mental state reasoning
(p) and also by learning processes in the absence of
hypothetical mental state reasoning (*p), then the
objectively measurable responses of organisms can give
no insight into the psychological causes of behavior.
This theme of sufficiency but not necessity suffuses the
contemporary literature in comparative cognition: It has
become almost a universal practice to report whether or not
the organisms under consideration have learned to respond
differentially over the course of an experiment. The sig-
nificance of this is that contemporary researchers almost
universally, albeit often implicitly, acknowledge in their
scientific practice that a given behavior pattern (q) does not
uniquely implicate a causal mental state (p) because pro-
cedures are adopted to clarify whether the organisms’
response patterns were in place before the experiment or
were acquired in the course of the experiment. In short,
there is a general agreement that any particular response
pattern (q) can emerge as a consequence of a hypothetical
inferential or other deductive hypothetical psychological
process (p) or by some non-deductive, non-inferential,
relatively simple learning process, such as classical or
operant conditioning (*p). This assumption is, however,
not warranted.
Theoretically, it could be the case that an inferential
causal process (p) is, itself, the product of a learning pro-
cess (r)—sufficient experience with appropriate feedback
(response consequences) could lead to a generalized
response pattern (q). In practice, most contemporary
researchers incorrectly take all circumstances in which
animals learn through experience (r) to discriminate the
relevant stimuli as evidence against p (see, e.g., Reddy and
Morris 2004); this was precisely the argument of Povinelli
and Eddy (1996) when their chimpanzee subjects displayed
Table 4 Conditional mental causality models and their implications
for comparative cognition
Assume p exists The reality: p is indeterminable
p q p )q p q p )q
Conditional (p is a sufficient cause q; p implies q)
T T T T? T ?
T F F* T? F ?
F T T F? T ?
F F T F? F ?
Under the assumption, at left, that p is determinable (i.e., that the
presence and absence of p is determinable, hence a truth value can be
legitimately applied to both p and q), the asterisk denotes the state of
the world that would disconfirm the premise p)q; in this case, when
a causal mental state (p) does not result in the implied behavior (q).
Here we argue that, in reality, because p is imaginary and cannot be
measured, as shown at right, therefore there is no possibility of dis-
confirming the premise p )q. Thus, all mental causality models that
posit certain mental states (p) to be sufficient causes for certain
behaviors (q) are unfalsifiable. Note that precisely the same reasoning
applies to the contrapositive: *q ) *p. In the cases of the inverse
(*p ) *q) and the converse (q ) p), the truth tables are slightly
different, such that the conditional is falsified when q is true (present)
and p is false (absent), but the general argument that the conditional is
unfalsifiable in the case of an imaginary p holds
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higher performance over time and with experience in their
experimental protocols. However, there is no compelling a
priori reason to contrast learning through experience
(r) with hypothetical causal mental states (p). If a gener-
alized response pattern (q) consistent with, say, an under-
standing of visual attention (p) emerges after sufficient
task-relevant experience (r), then it would be legitimate to
argue that correct responding (q) implies an understanding
of visual attention (p) because this task-relevant experience
(r, be it an intentionally administered training protocol or
simply developmental experience with the appropriate
contingency structures) is, itself, a sufficient condition for
the hypothetical causal mental state (p). Under this
framework, when apes do not display correct choice
behavior when given nonverbal cues to a baited container
(*q), it is a legitimate conclusion that they lack a
deductive or inferential understanding of visual attention
(*p) and it is also valid, in this framework, to argue that
they additionally lack the appropriate task-relevant expe-
rience (*r). According to the argument we are advancing,
here, given that learning experience can be, in principle,
objectively measured, then no account of cognitive per-
formance is complete in the absence of an understanding of
individual learning history. In many cases, particularly
with long-lived organisms, much is unknown about indi-
vidual learning histories, but this uncertainty about the
degree of task-relevant learning experience must be
explicitly acknowledged in all interpretations of socio-
cognitive performance. In addition, if performance can be
predicted by learning history, then there is no need to
appeal to hypothetical, invisible psychological variables in
the interpretation of performance. In fact, many contem-
porary critiques of the many published claims that animals
lack the kinds of causal psychological processes listed in
Table 1 take this general approach (e.g., Bard and Leavens
2014; Gardner 2008; Leavens 2006; Leavens et al. 2008;
Lyn 2010; Lyn et al. 2010; Racine et al. 2008; Russell et al.
2011). Hence, the widespread assumption that hypotheti-
cal, causal, inferential or deductive mental states (p), on the
one hand, and the operant learning through experience (r),
on the other hand, constitute mutually exclusive kinds of
causes of correct choice behavior in discrimination tasks is
unwarranted—it could be the case that a generalized
deductive process emerges given adequate learning
opportunities (e.g., Rumbaugh et al. 1996). More suc-
cinctly, the assumption that the existence of task-relevant
learning categorically excludes hypothetical acts of reason
(if p then *r AND if r then *p) is, itself, unfalsifiable,
due to the objective impossibility of demonstrating the
presence or absence of an invisible causal mental state p.
These considerations constrain the range of valid con-
clusions that can be drawn from ape–human performance
comparisons, specifically with respect to the use and
comprehension of communicative gestures, but also more
generally in the domain of social cognition. Significantly,
the premise of a conditional relationship between p and
q can only be falsified if we find p (a hypothetical mental
cause) in the absence of the predicted behavior pattern q—
as we have already noted, it is just as impossible to
empirically measure the presence of a hypothetical causal
mental state as it is to empirically measure demonic
influences. The reader can easily test the validity of our
claim by simple substitution. Examining Table 1, for each
of the hypothetical psychological constructs under the
column heading, ‘‘Putative mental state (p),’’ substitute for
that cognitive capability, ‘‘the influence of a demonic
spiritual agent.’’ Thus, where Povinelli and Eddy (1996)
argued that the conceptual understanding that seeing leads
to knowing will lead to high performance in their experi-
mental tasks (where, typically, organisms chose between
one of two experimenters), we are going to argue, here, that
when organisms are influenced by demonic spiritual agents
(p), then they will choose the experimenter who can see
them (q) more than would be expected by random choice
behavior. Let us take Povinelli and Eddy’s findings at face
value: The human children chose the experimenter who
could see them, whereas the apes did not.5 It is valid to
conclude from this pattern of results that the apes were not
under the apparent influence of demonic spiritual agents. It
cannot follow that the children were under such an influ-
ence—that would be a fallacious conclusion, an attempt to
argue from the consequent to the antecedent. Thus, the
major premises of these weaker, conditional mental
causality models (if p then q) are unfalsifiable, in principle,
as are the stronger biconditional versions (if p then q AND
if q then p).
To summarize: If we are given, on theoretical and
empirical grounds, the following framework: (a) Epistemic
states exist prior to choice behavior (e.g., Malle and
Hodges 2005); (b) epistemic states are not uniquely spec-
ified in choice behavior (e.g., Povinelli and Giambrone
2001); (c) epistemic states cause choice behavior, and (d) it
is impossible to directly measure mental states (Bergmann
1962; Vanderwolf 1998), and then mental causality models
are unfalsifiable, in principle. An entailment of this struc-
tural unfalsifiability is that these mental causality models
also cannot implicate the presence of any of the hypo-
thetical mental causes in any species, including humans. It
is not rational to conclude the presence of p from the
presence of q—this is a well-known logical fallacy, Affir-
mation of the Consequent. Hence, if one believes that
certain mental states (or demons, or angels, or spirits, or
5 This is a simplification: Actually the apes performed very well in
most conditions, either from the outset or with a modicum of
experience (see Povinelli and Eddy 1996).
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what have you) will cause organisms to point declaratively
(e.g., Carpenter and Call 2013), the display of a declarative
point cannot be legitimately taken to be evidence for the
alleged causal mental state (or any other imaginary cause).
Suppose that one’s major premise is that if it rains Sue will
get wet. If we find Sue to be wet, it does not follow that it
had rained, because there are so many other ways in which
Sue could have become wet. Because all of the studies in
Table 1 take precisely this logical form, therefore none of
the studies in Table 1 provides any evidence that young
humans act in accordance with the putative mental state
conceptions that the researchers claimed caused their
behavior. Thus, the two-group, two-species comparison
cannot, by its very design, illuminate the cognitive under-
pinnings of organisms’ understandings of social behavior
(Bard and Leavens 2014).6 These studies can only assert
that the groups tested performed differently, but are
unanimously mute on why that may be (see Racine et al.
2008, 2012).
At best, on purely logical grounds, researchers can deny
that non-humans make choices in their environment
informed by hypothetical mental state concepts but these
studies cannot, in principle, demonstrate that these hypo-
thetical concepts had any role, whatsoever, in the behavior
of organisms, usually young humans, who do act in
accordance with the theoretical stipulations that particular
mental states cause particular response patterns.
Beyond unfalsifiable psychologies
of communication
None of the studies in Table 1 constitutes a scientifically
legitimate claim for uniquely human communicative
motivations or cognitive processes. This is for two reasons:
one methodological and one logical. On methodological
grounds, there is no published demonstration of a response
difference in any direct ape–human comparison that is not
confounded with lurking variables, such as those listed in
Table 1. We are not the only researchers to have noted
these methodological infelicities (e.g., Boesch 2007; 2012;
Bulloch et al. 2008; Gardner 2008; Kellogg and Kellogg
1933; Lyn et al. 2010; Pedersen et al. 2009; Racine et al.
2008, 2012; Russell et al. 2011; Scheel et al. 2017), yet
two-group, two-species comparisons persist in the con-
temporary scientific literature.
On logical grounds, all claims of unique human psy-
chological capacities to represent the mental states of
others suffer from either unfalsifiability (no independent
measure of the alleged psychological capacities; e.g.,
Leavens et al. 2004b) or fallacious reasoning (taking a
discrimination, q, as evidence for a particular mental cause,
p, of that discrimination). Thus, there is no logical pathway
from overt, publicly available behavior to any claim of the
causal influence of any particular hypothetical mental state.
Note that there are cognitively relevant scientific
hypotheses that can be empirically tested. For one example,
as noted above, scientists have tested whether intensive
exposure to a linguistic environment would produce an ape
that speaks, and the answer seems to be that mere exposure
to speech (p) is not sufficient to produce speech (*q) in
apes (e.g., Kellogg 1968)—the major premise that speech
exposure causes speech production (if p then q) has been
falsified—this is a true species difference between apes and
humans. Similarly, it is possible to ask whether intensive
exposure to human cultural environments (p) can cause the
use of manual pointing gestures (q) in great apes: here, the
answer seems to be in the affirmative—all apes raised in
unusually close contact with humans (i.e., enculturated
apes), without a single exception, demonstrate pointing
behavior—there is, to date, no example of an ape who has
been enculturated (p) but who does not point (*q).7 Unlike
hypothetical, invisible mental causes, such antecedents as
these examples—speech-intensive early rearing environ-
ment or intensive exposure to human conventions of non-
verbal signaling—are empirically measurable, and hence
scientific hypotheses about relationships between ante-
cedents and consequents are, in principle, falsifiable.
Therefore, our general conclusion is that mental process
models that incorporate imaginary antecedents are fatally
unanchored in objective reality, therefore of little or no
utility in scientific hypothesis testing (Leavens et al. 2008,
fn 2).
In the absence of appropriate experimental designs and
adequate deductive methods, it is reasonable to ask whether
comparative or developmental psychology has anything
useful to contribute to our understanding of what is fre-
quently termed the ‘‘cognitive foundations’’ of communi-
cation development. We think, first, that the ambition is
over-blown for at least two reasons. First, in our judge-
ment, claims of illuminating the ‘‘cognitive underpinnings’’
of communicative behavior in preverbal humans, great
apes, and other animals are inflated to the very degree that
aspects of ‘‘cognitive underpinnings’’ are hypothetical—if
both cherished theoretical constructs such as discernment
of false belief, a motivation to share feelings or epistemic
6 There are other possible outcomes of any given ape–human
comparison: It could be the case that there are no systematic group
performance differences; in this case, under the mental causality
model, one can only conclude that there is no evidence of group
differences in hypothetical causal mental states—positive conclusions
to the effect that the subjects are motivated by the same hypothetical
causal mental states are unwarranted.
7 One enculturated ape, Viki, was reported to point to nearby objects,
but not distally (Hayes and Hayes 1954).
Anim Cogn
123
states, or an understanding of visual attention, on the one
hand, and a history of task-relevant experience with an
appropriate reward-contingency structure, on the other
hand, can result in an organism that can make generalized
discriminations of the kinds employed in the studies listed
in Table 1, then the state of reality is that these two classes
of cause (mental state versus operant history) do not make
contrasting predictions about behavior. Moreover, as we
argued above, mental state causes and learning of social
contingencies through experience are not necessarily
mutually exclusive antecedents. In addition, as we have
illustrated (Table 1), no researcher has ever isolated evo-
lutionary history as a factor in ape–human differences in
published assays of comparative social cognition involving
direct ape–human comparisons, particularly the social
cognition of communication; the reason for this systematic
design failure is attributable to the difficulty of properly
matching groups sampled from different species. Our
argument, here, is that this failure to match on so many
crucial life history and procedural variables should not
continue to be ignored in the contemporary literature.
Finally, according to our analysis, where responses to
cognitive challenge are viewed as the effects of hypothet-
ical, invisible causes, as in a substantial fraction of work in
this area, it is both logically and empirically impossible to
demonstrate the influence of these same hypothetical cau-
ses. We think that there are at least four productive
approaches to comparative social cognition that avoid these
systemic problems: cross-fostering of apes by humans;
radical operationalization; training; and sampling across
the full ecological range of a species.
Cross-fostering
Cross-fostering of apes by humans has a long history
(Gardner and Gardner 1969; Hayes and Hayes 1954; Hillix
and Rumbaugh 2004; Hoyt 1941; Kearton 1925; Kellogg
and Kellogg 1933; Ladygina-Kohts 1935; Matsuzawa
1985; Miles 1990; Patterson and Cohn 1990; Premack and
Premack 1972; Rumbaugh 1977; Savage-Rumbaugh 1986;
Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1978; Temerlin 1976; Witmer
1909). As noted by Kellogg (1968):
Although often misunderstood, the scientific rationale
for rearing an anthropoid ape in a human household is
to find out just how far the ape can go in absorbing
the civilizing influences of the environment. To what
degree is it capable of responding like a child and to
what degree will genetic factors limit its develop-
ment? (p 426).
We note that, from a purely methodological point of
view, these cross-fostering studies ameliorate, to varying
extents, the incommensurate individual learning histories
that apes and humans typically bring to experimental
challenge. Astonishing insights into the capabilities of our
nearest living relatives to comprehend spoken or signed
language (e.g., Gardner and Gardner 1969; Rumbaugh
1977; Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1993), and to produce
symbolic communication have been demonstrated by the
classic cross-fostering studies (e.g., Gardner and Gardner
1969; Hayes and Hayes 1954; Kellogg and Kellogg 1933;
Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1978; Patterson and Cohn 1990).
These studies have repeatedly shown, for example, that
apes do not produce even modest repertoires of spoken
language, even when given exposure to broadly the same
linguistic input as human children (Kellogg 1968). Yet,
these cross-fostered apes do produce species-atypical
communicative competencies. For example, Chantek, a
sign-language-trained orangutan (Pongo pygmaeus) has
displayed highly competent comprehension of pointing
(Call and Tomasello 1994; Tomasello et al. 1997), belying
the frequent false claim that great apes have difficulty
comprehending these deictic signals—apparently when
sufficient task-relevant pre-experimental experience is
given to apes (i.e., when apes are matched with human
children on this critical variable), then they act more like
human children do (e.g., Leavens 2014; Leavens and Bard
2011; Leavens et al. 2010; Lyn et al. 2010; Russell et al.
2011). Cross-fostering of apes by humans has significant
ethical implications: some apes who are both cross-fostered
and isolated from their conspecifics have experienced
particularly grim outcomes, especially when inadequate
provision has been made for their long-term psychological
well-being (Fouts and Mills 1997). Many contemporary
researchers now hold the view that cross-fostering of apes
by humans is categorically unethical (Fouts and Mills
1997), although infant apes in zoos are routinely cross-
fostered by humans on a temporary basis when their sur-
vival is at risk. Consideration of these factors can only
highlight the importance of the dwindling populations of
cross-fostered apes for understanding environmental
influences on cognitive development (e.g., Lyn et al. 2010).
Radical operationalization
We (e.g., Leavens et al. 2004a, 2005a, 2008) and others
(e.g., Bourjade et al. 2015; Townsend et al. 2017) have
advocated a radical operationalization of mental state ter-
minology. We believe that, in the absence of any empiri-
cally grounded pathway toward clarification of mental
causes, the theoretical assumptions of the causal mental
state model are scientifically untestable due either to
(a) inappropriate ontology (a metaphysical concern) or
(b) to the technically immature state of experimental
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psychology (an epistemological concern; for criticisms of
ontology, see, among many others, Barrett 2014; Di Paolo
and De Jaegher 2012; Leudar and Costall 2004; and Varela
et al. 1991), and for technical limitations; see, e.g., Berg-
mann 1962, Clark 2001). The central difference between
radical operationalization and the mental causality model
of psychological processing is that whereas mental
causality models view behavior as effects of mental causes,
radical operationalization views mental states as being
sufficiently defined by behavior and context. No organism,
A, can base an evidenced judgement about the motivation
of another organism, B, in the absence of (a) B’s physical
behavior, (b) the physical antecedents of B’s behavior, or
(c) the physical consequences of B’s behavior; in the
absence of supernatural causes, all mental states must be
expressed in physical terms (Leavens et al. 2008). There-
fore, it is arbitrary to exclude objectively measurable
physical aspects of an organism’s comportment in the
world from the category of mental states—mental states are
embodied as much in our muscles, our skeletons, and our
artifacts as in our brains (e.g., Barrett 2014; Brinck 2014;
Johnson 2001). Thus, with respect to intentional commu-
nication, human babies are said to communicate inten-
tionally when they act as if they have goals in advance of
signaling, when they tactically accommodate their signals
to the attentional availability of an interlocutor, and when
they act to manipulate the visual focus of an interlocuter—
all of these patterns are empirically discoverable, in any
species (Leavens et al. 2005a; Townsend et al. 2017). This
approach will not reveal hypothetical psychological causal
factors, but as we’ve argued, here, this incapacity is
inherent in all contemporary approaches to comparative
and developmental social cognition. Moreover, there are
exciting new theoretical approaches to cognition that reject
mental causality (e.g., Barrett 2015; Barrett and Henzi
2005; Bateson 1972; Baum 2002; Chemero 2011; Johnson
2001; Rachlin 1992; Shanker and King 2002; Varela et al.
1991) in a variety of different ways that need not concern
us here; the significant fact of these alternative theoretical
approaches, for present purposes, is that they are not sub-
ject to the same scientific problems outlined in the pre-
ceding pages in relation to the mental causality model
(Leudar and Costall 2004; Sehon 2000).
Training
We (Bard and Leavens 2014; Hopkins et al. 2013; Leavens
2006, 2014; Leavens et al. 2008, 2015; the present analy-
sis) and others (e.g., Boesch 2007, 2010, 2012; Gardner
2008; Kellogg 1968; Rumbaugh et al. 1996) have noted
that, in general, many contemporary, cross-species tests of
social cognition involve the testing of apes on their
understanding of culturally situated human conventions of
gestural signaling (e.g., pointing or gazing to the location
of hidden entities). Because most of these apes lack
exposure to these communicative conventions, particularly
in relation to the Western human children with whom they
are being compared, therefore, it would be scientifically
productive to train non-humans for long periods with
experiences designed to foster the discriminations that are
used to test subjects’ social cognition. Consider, for
example, that it takes human children approximately
9 months from birth to follow a pointing gesture to a
nearby location and almost twice that long to follow a
pointing gesture to a location behind themselves (Butter-
worth 2003). If we find that an organism fails to follow a
pointing gesture with less than 18 months of comparable
exposure (as did Povinelli et al. 1997 and Tomasello et al.
1997, among others), then it cannot follow from this that
the species lacks the cognitive capacity for this compre-
hension because the organism has been handicapped by
lack of task-relevant pre-experimental experience, relative
to human children. Yet many researchers continue to claim
that apes are cognitively deficient, relative to humans,
when representatives of apes are exposed to these signals
for a few minutes in an afternoon or two (Leavens 2006), or
exposed at much reduced absolute or relative frequencies
(Thomas et al. 2008).
We believe that task-relevant and extended training
protocols for passing these kinds of socio-cognitive assays
with apes have great promise in illuminating the factors in
the environments of human babies that foster commu-
nicative development in our own species. We note that
many contemporary researchers reject this idea because
they argue that humans display these competencies
‘‘spontaneously’’ (e.g., Bohn et al. 2015, 2016; Carpenter
and Call 2013; Povinelli et al. 2003; Warneken et al. 2007),
but as we see it, usually when a behavioral scientist claims
that a capability is displayed ‘‘spontaneously,’’ this is
tantamount to a confession that the ontogenetic pathway to
that capability is not known—it cannot be taken as evi-
dence that the behavior of interest has no developmental
history, nor can ‘‘spontaneous’’ exhibition of a behavior
constitute evidence that this behavior has no learned basis.8
Again, if apes are isolated from a suite of specific eco-
logical factors in early development to which human
children are intensively exposed, then it is naı¨ve to assume
that these factors had no influence on the later ‘‘sponta-
neous’’ display of particular competencies by the human
children. Only in the case that organisms do not display a
competency after very extensive training protocols
designed to facilitate those competencies can the
8 Thanks to Roger K. Thomas for this observation (Leavens 2015).
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hypothesis of species incapacity be legitimately entertained
(Leavens et al. 2015).
Sampling
It is now well-understood that psychology has been overly
reliant on Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and
democratic (WEIRD: Henrich et al. 2010) samples to
represent the entire human species, and we have observed
that similar biases exist in the sampling of great apes and
other non-human comparison groups in comparative psy-
chology (Bard and Leavens 2014; Hopkins et al. 2013;
Leavens et al. 2005b, 2010; also see Boesch
2007, 2010, 2012). There are systematic differences in
performance on cognitive assays between groups of rep-
resentatives within species, and these can be manifested
very early in development (Bard et al. 2014a, b). Thus, a
fruitful avenue of research for comparative psychologists is
to compare, within-species, groups that have experienced
systematically different early rearing experiences (e.g.,
Bard et al. 2014a, b; Call and Tomasello 1994; Lyn et al.
2010; Pitman and Shumaker 2009; Rumbaugh et al. 1996;
Russell et al. 2011). A post hoc approach, sampling the
range of phenotypic variation within a species, can identify
environmental plasticity, paving the way for further
exploration of specific environmental factors (e.g., Leavens
et al. 2010). Because almost everything we know about
human cognitive development also rests on post hoc sam-
pling of different groups, for good ethical reasons, such
sampling does not constitute a methodological weakness,
relative to our sampling of humans. A second challenge of
this approach is the sheer difficulty of acquiring apprecia-
ble samples of subjects for study across the range of rearing
environments, but we note that even very small-sample
studies can produce extraordinarily large effects, when
carefully conducted—for example, Call and Tomasello
(1994) reported large performance differences in the use
and comprehension of pointing gestures between two
orangutans, tested in similar protocols in the same testing
environment, that clearly demonstrated a lack of parity in
their responses to the cognitive challenges administered in
that study.
Conclusions
On both methodological and logical grounds, the mental
causality model of psychological processes has failed to
produce any unambiguous ape–human differences in social
cognition. Despite numerous claims to the contrary, no
current scientific methodology has isolated evolutionary
history as the causal factor in alleged ape–human
differences in social cognition. Moreover, every such claim
of a ‘‘species difference’’ has been refuted by superior
methodological approaches, involving within-species
explorations of specific competencies (see notes to
Table 1). Thus, where differences have been reported
between ape and human groups, the relevant factors
accounting for these differences (environmental, genetic)
remain unknown. Thus, to claim a ‘‘species difference’’ in
social cognition between apes and humans, at our present
state of knowledge, is to promulgate the same kinds of
prejudices that hereditarians evinced in the early history of
biometric approaches to the study of intelligence—all
group differences were taken to be evidence for innate,
primary differences in abilities between different groups of
humans, and environmental influences on mental devel-
opment were routinely ignored (Gould 1981). Tables 1 and
2 document the same sort of wishful thinking (systematic
bias) in the face of the numerous confounds listed there.
On logical grounds, the existence of hypothetical,
causal mental states cannot be confirmed, with present
technology. Hence, there is no evidence that the com-
municative signaling of humans, great apes or other ani-
mals, is predicated on substantially different cognitive
bases. Current psychological process models that
emphasize the allegedly causal nature of imaginary,
invisible psychological processes like those listed in
Table 1 are unfalsifiable, for several reasons, but pri-
marily because no putative causal mental state, to date, is
uniquely specified by any particular behavior pattern. By
rudimentary logical principles, therefore the existence or
effect of these imaginary, alleged psychological causal
mental factors cannot be demonstrated by appeal to par-
ticular behavioral response patterns.
The field of comparative psychology could benefit from
greater attention to the ecologically situated competencies
of all research subjects/participants—especially cross-fos-
tered animals, a greater commitment to operationalization
of mental state concepts, intensive training studies, and
sampling of subjects across a wider range of rearing his-
tories. We think that it is especially important not to reject,
out of hand, relevant evidence from populations that might
differ in important ecological circumstances from one’s
own study population. Thus, if we study institutionalized
representatives of a species of ape and we find that they
systematically differ in their communicative behavior from
reports of their conspecifics who have been cross-fostered
by humans or conspecifics living in wild habitats, we
believe that it is more scientifically informative and fruitful
to take these differences as signposts to ecological factors
that might influence communication development, than it is
to reject the evidence outright on such grounds as, for
example, that the animals are raised in unnatural circum-
stances, or that those studying wild populations cannot
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adequately control the circumstances of their observations
(Bard and Leavens 2014; Leavens et al. 2010).
The central message of this analysis for researchers
interested in the origins of language is that too strong a
focus on specific communicative behaviors (e.g., pointing
with the index finger, declarative-expressive communica-
tion, vocal signals with apparent semantic content, and so
on) without proportionate attention to (a) the contextual
influences on subjects’ responses (e.g., Hopkins et al. 2007;
Leavens et al. 2005a, 2010; Schel et al. 2013), (b) the
developmental course of these communicative signals (e.g.,
Bard and Leavens 2014; Bard et al. 2014a, b), (c) the
concomitant bodily correlates of the signals (e.g., Leavens
and Hopkins 2005; Slocombe et al. 2011), and (d) the range
of variation in communicative repertoires within species
(e.g., Hobaiter and Byrne 2011; Leavens et al. 2010;
Roberts et al. 2014; Wich et al. 2008, 2012) will too
easily—and inaccurately—load communicative and theo-
retical cognitive competencies on the human lineage, after
our split from our nearest living relatives. Like humans,
other animals develop their communicative repertoires in
specific ecological contexts, and their signaling adapts,
ontogenetically, to these specific environmental circum-
stances. Sensitive attention to how animals deploy their
signals in relation to these local ecological challenges, with
consideration of their specific individual learning experi-
ences (i.e., systematic patterns of response consequences),
will illuminate the true range of communicative compe-
tencies in any given species. To give an example from our
own research, we find that when the environment provides
a function for communicating with deictic gestures (refer-
ential signaling), then chimpanzees will display referential
gestures (e.g., Leavens et al. 1996, 2005a), despite the
extreme rareness of pointing in chimpanzees’ wild habitats
(Hobaiter et al. 2014), and similar results have been
reported for a range of non-human primates including
orangutans (Cartmill and Byrne 2007; Miles 1990; Pele´
et al. 2009) and gorillas (Gorilla gorilla, Tanner et al.
2006). Thus, the capacity for gestural reference results
from the dynamic dialectic of interaction between organ-
isms and their specific, lived ecological configurations, and
we might therefore reasonably speculate that the last
common ancestor of apes and humans had a latent capacity
for referential signaling that is particularly adaptive, in
ontogenetic terms, in WEIRD human rearing environ-
ments. This environmentally based behavioral variation in
signaling behavior by groups of animals sampled from the
same gene pool authorizes the search for those particular
ecological factors that support referential communication
during development (Leavens et al. 2005b). This approach
is inherently more fruitful than to compare differently aged
representatives of humans and great apes with virtually no
experimental control over task-relevant pre-observational
experience, incommensurate sampling protocols, and often
radically different test procedures—an investigative
approach that we are condemning in this paper: any dif-
ferences that emerge in response profiles between groups
compared in this makeshift manner will never constitute
evidence for some kind of ‘‘key’’ cognitive adaptation for
communication in the human lineage (Bard and Leavens
2014). Rather, the only firm conclusion that can be made is
that apes not raised in western, postindustrial households
do not act very much like human children who were raised
in those specific ecological circumstances, a result that
should surprise no one. The two-group, two-species ape–
human comparison is scientifically untenable; we present
four methodological remedies to the mismeasure of ape
social cognition.
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